University of Michigan Law School

University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository
Articles

Faculty Scholarship

2022

A Quiet Revolution: How Judicial Discipline Essentially Eliminated
Foster Care and Nearly Went Unnoticed.
Melissa Carter
Christopher Church
Vivek Sankaran

University of Michigan Law School, vss@umich.edu

Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles/2687

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles
Part of the Family Law Commons, Judges Commons, and the Juvenile Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Carter, Melissa, Cristopher Church, and Vivek Sankaran. "A Quiet Revolution: How Judicial Discipline
Essentially Eliminated Foster Care and Nearly Went Unnoticed." Columbia Journal of Race and Law 12, no.
1 (2022).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

COLUMBIA JOURNAL
OF RACE AND LAW
VOL. 12

JUNE 2022

NO. 1

A QUIET REVOLUTION:
HOW JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE ESSENTIALLY
ELIMINATED FOSTER CARE AND NEARLY WENT
UNNOTICED
Melissa Carter, Cristopher Church, & Vivek Sankaran
“Of all tyrannies, a tyranny sincerely exercised for the good of its victims
may be the most oppressive. It would be better to live under robber barons
than under omnipotent moral busybodies. The robber baron’s cruelty may
sometimes sleep, his cupidity may at some point be satiated; but those who
torment us for our own good will torment us without end for they do so
with the approval of their own conscience.”
–C. S. Lewis1
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I. INTRODUCTION
This Piece proposes a rather unremarkable concept: that juvenile
court judges can safely reduce the number of children entering foster care
by faithfully and rigorously applying the law. What is remarkable,
however, is that judges often fail to perform this core function when a state
child welfare agency separates a child from their family. Despite evidence
that removal decisions are not carefully scrutinized by courts,2 the child
welfare community continues to de-emphasize the role of the judge as an
impartial gatekeeper—as the law requires—and instead encourages a
different sort of jurist: one with distracting leadership responsibilities on
and off the bench; one with responsibility to oversee individual cases but
also advocate for broad systemic reform; one who is actively involved with
families, making clinical decisions regarding their personal affairs. In this
Piece, we invite judges to explore whether such extraneous responsibilities
advance justice for families, or instead create an inviting space for
“omnipotent moral busybodies” to emerge.3 This Piece argues that the
emphasis on that different sort of jurist is misplaced, and that judges must
prioritize their role as gatekeeper above all else, particularly during the
preadjudication phase of civil child abuse and neglect proceedings.4
The Piece makes its argument by focusing on the work of Judge
Ernestine Gray, who sat on the Orleans Parish Juvenile Court for nearly
forty years. Judge Gray’s disciplined approach to rigorously applying the
law during the preadjudication phase transformed New Orleans Parish’s
intervention in families into what such intervention is meant to be: a rare,
time-limited event. Judge Gray’s disciplined approach led New Orleans to
become the first major city in the United States to essentially eliminate
foster care. In 2011, there were over two hundred children in foster care.5
2 See, e.g., CUTLER INST. FOR CHILD & FAM. POL’Y, MUSKIE SCH. PUB. SERV., & CTR.
CHILD. & THE LAW, AM. BAR ASSOC., MICHIGAN COURT IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM
REASSESSMENT 102–103, 105 (2005) (reporting from a state-wide judges’ survey that 85.1%
of judges surveyed never or rarely made an affirmative finding that the agency failed to make
reasonable efforts to reunify even when they believed the agency did not make such efforts);
J. Mary Tabor, Transformation in Child Welfare: Iowa Courts’ Pilot Project on Juvenile
Justice Shows Reduction in Termination of Parental Rights Cases, in 80 IOWA LAW. 10–12
(Iowa State Bar Assoc., 2020) (discussing positive changes from a pilot initiative setting forth
four questions for juvenile court judges to ask child welfare agency staff prior to approving
an ex parte removal request, for the purpose of preventing the unnecessary removal of
children from their parents). For legal scholarship considering courts’ role in family
separation, see Paul Chill, Burden of Proof Begone: The Pernicious Effect of Emergency
Removal in Child Protective Proceedings, 42 FAM. CT. REV. 540 (2004); Vivek S. Sankaran &
Christopher E. Church, Easy Come, Easy Go: The Plight of Children who Spend Less than
Thirty Days in Foster Care, 19 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 207 (2016); Shanta Trivedi, The
Harm of Child Removal, 43 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 523, 552–62 (2019); Vivek
Sankaran, Christopher Church & Monique Mitchell, A Cure Worse Than the Disease? The
Impact of Removal on Children and Their Families, 102 MARQ. L. REV. 1163, 1177–89 (2019).
3 LEWIS, supra note 1.
4 We use the term “preadjudication phase” to refer to all hearings that precede the
formal hearing on the merits when the court finds as a matter of law that a child is an abused,
neglected, or dependent child.
5 Child. Bureau, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., Adoption and Foster Care
Analysis and Reporting System (AFCARS) Foster Care Files, Federal Fiscal Years 2010–
2020, NAT’L DATA ARCHIVE ON CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT [hereinafter AFCARS Dataset],
https://www.ndacan.acf.hhs.gov/datasets/datasets-list-afcars-foster-care.cfm [https://perma.
cc/JSV7-VS64] (data on file with corresponding author). Unless otherwise noted, AFCARS
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By March of 2017, just twenty children were in foster care, in a city with
more than 75,000 children.6
The significance of this reduction cannot be overstated. With 285
children in foster care, New Orleans would have a foster care utilization
rate comparable to statewide rates in Louisiana.7 With 481 children in
care, its foster care utilization rate would be comparable to the national
rate.8 Instead, on March 31, 2020, the city had just forty-nine children in
care, one-tenth of the national rate.9 Even more notably, children who do
enter foster care in the Orleans Parish typically spend a matter of weeks
separated from family, in contrast to the years-long stays typical for
children in care in other jurisdictions.10 What exists today in New Orleans
is not a foster care system by any familiar standards.
Thus, this Piece offers an opportunity to better understand Judge
Gray’s approach and its impact on children and families in her community.
Her approach provides lessons for juvenile court judges across the country.
The first Part highlights the current pressures juvenile court judges face
to take on a broader role than their judicial oath or child welfare’s legal
framework requires. It assesses how those pressures have resulted in a
juvenile court that risks becoming a “tyranny sincerely exercised for the
good of its victims.”11 The second Part closely examines Judge Gray’s
approach and details its impact on the New Orleans foster care system. It
includes an overview of administrative data and a discussion of the
practices, policies, and values Judge Gray brought to the bench. It also
outlines the argument that these practices led to significantly less reliance
on foster care in Orleans Parish—to the point of its near-elimination—
without jeopardizing children’s safety. The Piece concludes with a plea for
judges to embrace their role as gatekeeper, rigorously and dispassionately
enforcing the law to ensure that children enter and remain in foster care
only when the state produces evidence that meets the high burden required
to justify family separation.

datasets utilized in this Piece were made available by the National Data Archive on Child
Abuse and Neglect (“NDACAN”), Cornell University, Ithaca, New York. Data from the
AFCARS Foster Care Files are originally collected by state child welfare agencies pursuant
to federal reporting requirements. Authors and collaborators at Fostering Court
Improvement have analyzed the data, and analyses are on file with them. Neither the
collection of the original data, the Archive, Cornell University, or its agents or employees
bear any responsibility for the analyses or interpretations presented here.
6 Id. at FFY 2017.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 The figure of forty-nine children in care in the Orleans Parish represents a rate of
4.8 children in care for every 10,000 children in the population, compared to the national
rate of 57.6 children in care for every 10,000 in the population. AFCARS Dataset, supra note
5, at FFY 2020.
10 Among the eighty-five children discharged in the Orleans Parish during the most
recent twelve months, the median length of stay was 0.4 months, compared to 15.5 months
nationally. Id.
11 See LEWIS, supra note 1, at 292.
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II. THE JUVENILE COURT JUDGE: GATEKEEPER OR
COLLABORATOR
The role of the judge occupies a place of central concern for lawyers
and their clients. A lawyer’s knowledge of the tendencies, preferences, and
philosophy of the judge constitutes an essential component of legal strategy
and informs the tactical presentation of a case. A casual inquiry into the
common wisdom about the role of a judge often elicits metaphors like
“umpire” or “referee.”12 Generally speaking, the traditional judicial role is
understood as one of presiding impartially over a case in order to ensure
the integrity of the process, protecting the rights of the parties, interpreting
and applying the law, and making individualized legal determinations to
resolve a conflict.13
The origins and evolution of the juvenile court have nurtured an
alternative model and different expectation for the judicial role.
Progressive reformers lauded the juvenile court as an innovation,
distinguished as the “first attempt to provide diagnosis and training to
delinquents.”14 This is the origin story of the juvenile court as a problemsolving court. Exercising its parens patriae authority, the court intervened
in the lives of wayward youth to provide protective supervision and
rehabilitation.15 It advanced these goals as both necessary and socially
desirable. As observed by Judge Julian Mack, one of the nation’s first
juvenile court judges, “[t]he problem of the delinquent child, though
juristically comparatively simple, is, in its social significance, of the
greatest importance, for upon its wise solution depends the future of many
of the rising generation.”16 From its very beginning, the purpose of the
juvenile court was defined as much by an ambition to address a social
problem as by the discipline of the law. The court “provided a setting in
which the routine practices of child-saving established in the nineteenth
century could be continued in a more legitimate form.”17 Put directly, the
jurisdictional authority of the juvenile court inherently allows it to act as
an “omnipotent moral busybody.”18
The juvenile court judge carries out their role guided by a sense of
legal and moral obligation to satisfy the dual societal and institutional aims
of child protection. The judge’s task is to serve as an arbiter of conflict, but
as many practitioners and scholars have observed, that is not the full
measure of the juvenile court judge’s role.19 Overtime, the juvenile court
judge’s role has blossomed into an expansive responsibility, combining the
12

(2007).

See, e.g., Theodore A. McKee, Judges as Umpires, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1709

13 See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1281, 1286 (1976) (discussing the traditional role of the appellate court judge as a
passive arbiter of established law).
14 John R. Sutton, The Juvenile Court and Social Welfare: Dynamics of Progressive
Reform, 19 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 107, 108 (1985).
15 See Esther K. Hong, A Reexamination of the Parens Patriae Power, 88 TENN. L.
REV. 277, 278 (2021).
16 Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV L. REV. 104, 104 (1909).
17 Sutton, supra note 14, at 108.
18 LEWIS, supra note 1.
19 See, e.g., Jane M. Spinak, Judicial Leadership in Family Court: A Cautionary
Tale, 10 TENN. J.L. & POL’Y 47, 49 (2014).
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traditional judicial roles of process manager, adjudicator, and enforcer of
rights, with a responsibility to co-create solutions for families and lead
system improvement efforts. Juvenile court judges are expected to act as
proactive problem-solvers and to fulfill additional administrative,
collaborative, and advocacy duties.20 As Judge Anthony Sciolino, a retired
family court judge, writes colloquially, “[A]t various times . . . a judge is
called upon to act in the role of salesperson, substitute parent, cheerleader,
arm twister, evangelist, planner, fundraiser (within the constraints of the
Canons of Judicial Ethics) and consensus builder.”21 These multiple roles
invite, and perhaps command, the juvenile court judge to depart from the
“impartial, restrained and objective judge in the common law tradition and
shift judicial responsibility from individualized legal determinations to a
broader conception of judicial leadership.”22
Rationalized by the therapeutic orientation of the juvenile court,
the contemporary conception of judicial leadership in the family separation
system has been organized around the principle of “collaboration.” In its
influential 2004 recommendations for strengthening court oversight of
child welfare cases, the Pew Commission on Children in Foster Care called
for “incentives and requirements for collaboration between courts and child
welfare agencies on behalf of children in foster care.”23 The
recommendations gained traction with policymakers, resulting in a federal
requirement for courts and child welfare agencies to “demonstrat[e]
meaningful and ongoing collaboration.”24 Guidance expounding on the
requirement defines “meaningful, ongoing collaboration” to mean that
courts and agencies “identify and work toward shared goals and activities
to increase the safety, permanency, and well-being of children in the child
welfare system.”25 Moreover, the explicit expectation of such collaboration
consists of “institutional and infrastructural changes that lead to
measurably improved outcomes for the children and families that the state
is serving.”26 This dynamic has forged an enduring link between the role of
the juvenile court judge and the advancement of individual and systemic
outcomes. And collaboration between the judicial and executive branches
is the predetermined manner for the fulfillment of this role and
achievement of these outcomes.

20 See SOPHIA I. GATOWSKI ET AL., NAT’L COUNCIL OF JUV. & FAM. CT. JUDGES,
ENHANCED RESOURCE GUIDELINES: IMPROVING COURT PRACTICE IN CHILD ABUSE AND
NEGLECT CASES 8 (2016) [hereinafter NCJFCJ, COURT PRACTICE GUIDELINES]; see also
Remarks of Judge Leonard P. Edwards at the Presentation of the William H. Rehnquist
Award for Judicial Excellence (Nov. 18, 2004), reprinted in 5 J. CTR. FAMS. CHILD. & THE
CTS. 169 (2004).
21 Anthony J. Sciolino, The Changing Role of the Family Court Judge: New Ways of
Stemming the Tide, CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 395, 403 (2005).
22 Spinak, supra note 19, at 49.
23 PEW COMM’N ON CHILD. IN FOSTER CARE, FOSTERING THE FUTURE: SAFETY,
PERMANENCE AND WELL-BEING FOR CHILDREN 36 (2004), https://www.pewtrusts.org/-/
media/legacy/uploadedfiles/phg/content_level_pages/reports/0012pdf
[https://perma.cc/
S8E6-C47X].
24 42 U.S.C. § 629h(b)(3).
25 ADMIN. FOR CHILD. & FAMS., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., ACYF-CBPI-16-05, INSTRUCTIONS FOR STATE COURTS APPLYING FOR COURT IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM
(CIP) FUNDS FOR FISCAL YEARS (FYS) 2017–2021, at 6 (Oct. 27, 2016).
26 Id. at 7.
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An expansive body of practice guidance has developed as a
complement to formal policy, exalting collaboration as the hallmark of
judicial leadership. The National Council of Juvenile and Family Court
Judges (“NCJFCJ”) reinforces the emphasis on collaboration time and
again.27 It is revered as a best practice, endorsed as the method by which
juvenile court judges hold parties and other stakeholders responsible for
achieving individual and systemic outcomes related to child safety,
permanency, and well-being.28 The NCJFCJ’s Enhanced Resource
Guidelines instruct that juvenile court judges, in order to effectively fulfill
their roles “as gatekeepers to the foster care system and guardians of the
original problem-solving court,” must collaboratively “engage families,
professionals, organizations, and communities to effectively support child
safety, permanency, and well-being.”29 It is clear that this view of the judge
as lead collaborator goes beyond an aspiration: judges, advocates, and
stakeholders widely accept collaboration as the gold standard for achieving
not only results that are legally mandated for children and families but
also those that are desired by the broader child welfare community.
Though rarely questioned, collaboration may not always prove to be
beneficial for the goals to which it is keyed. The success of any collaboration
results in part from situational factors, including the timing, the capacity
and competence of participants, the frequency and quality of
communication, and the shared focus on clear, common goals.30 These
factors are neither consistently present nor sufficiently controllable in the
context of a child welfare case.31 The incongruency between the features of
a successful model of collaboration and the nonlinear, complex nature of a
dependency proceeding can cause inconsistent rulings, unnecessary delay,
and an erosion of confidence in the juvenile court. All of these consequences
threaten the integrity of the process and the quality and timeliness of
outcomes for children and families.
Most significantly, a collaborative model can compromise and
distort the aims of the proceedings.32 A perception, by the parties, of the
judge as a collaborative partner lends itself to a false presumption that the
court can solve the complex social problems that brought the family before
it.33 Yet, as Judge Mack recognized from the outset, “[m]ost of the children
27 See NCJFCJ, COURT PRACTICE GUIDELINES, supra note 20, at 11 (recommending
collaboration “among all aspects of the court and child welfare system”).
28 Id. at 17; see also SOPHIA I. GATOWSKI ET AL., NAT’L COUNCIL OF JUV. & FAM. CT.
JUDGES, ENHANCED RESOURCE GUIDELINES: CHILD WELFARE CASEWORKERS’ COMPANION
GUIDE 21 (2020) (“The role of the juvenile and family court judge is a unique one and it
combines judicial, administrative, collaborative, and systemic advocacy roles. By taking on
these roles, the juvenile and family court judge holds all stakeholders, including the court,
responsible to ensure safe, timely permanency and well-being for children.”).
29 NCJFCJ, COURT PRACTICE GUIDELINES, supra note 20, at 14.
30 See Dorothy Norris-Tirrell, Assessing Multiple Dimensions of Collaboration, 35 J.
HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. ADMIN. 4, 4–5 , 7 (2012).
31 See generally Suparna Malempati, The Illusion of Due Process for Children in
Dependency Proceedings, 44 CUMB. L. REV. 181 (2014) (describing the complexity of
dependency proceedings by reference to the realities of being governed by multiple federal
and state laws, unfolding through an elaborate procedural scheme with adversarial positions
emerging at any time and changing over the course of an extended case time frame, and
involving multiple decision points).
32 See Spinak, supra note 19, at 70–75.
33 For a fuller discussion of these social problems, see id.
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who come before the court are, naturally, the children of the poor,”34 and
even the modern-day juvenile court lacks the resources and tools to address
issues of poverty or to remediate chronic family and community adversity.
This results in a misalignment of expectation that is exacerbated by an
inherent power imbalance. A collaborative orientation can obscure the
court’s coercive authority and deceive the parties and their legal
representatives into believing that everyone in the courtroom is a co-equal
when, in fact, the judge commands the awesome power to separate and
reconfigure the child’s family.
The overemphasis on collaboration can also distort the judge’s own
sense of responsibility for legal decisions, lessening or even undermining
the legal rigor needed to ensure a disciplined adherence to the law and to
reach decisions based on properly presented evidence. The traditional
judicial role is one characterized by a passive judge, with limited
involvement in fact-finding, who decides issues identified by the parties in
accordance with formal rules and statutes.35 As commonly conceived, the
role of the judge is that of a “neutral umpire, charged with little or no
responsibility for the factual aspects of the case or for shaping and
organizing the litigation for trial.”36 In contrast, a problem-solving
orientation to the role is necessarily outcome-determinative. The belief that
the judge can and should play a role in trying to solve the problems
reflected on the court docket may habituate decision-making based on
therapeutic impulse. Humanitarian motives may displace more proper
inquiry into whether a clear legal basis for intervention in a family exists
or scrutiny as to the sufficiency of the child welfare agency’s efforts to keep
families together. In this way, “collaborations blur the adversarial
opposition of the parties and complicate the judge’s neutrality.”37 The
imbalance increases the risk of greater and unnecessary intrusion into
family privacy, unwarranted family separation, and infliction of trauma.
These risks are highest at the preadjudication phase when the
“friendly interest of the State”38 is incongruous with the constitutional
rights of parents and children. During the preadjudication phase, the state
has not yet proven a parent to be unfit and bears the burden of doing so.
Courts cannot presume that such unfitness warranting the need for
judicial intervention exists. Thus, at this stage, the court’s primary role
must be to examine whether the state has met the legal standard justifying
such intervention. The next Part explores the dramatic outcomes that can
occur when a judge—in this case Judge Gray—brings a disciplined
approach to the preadjudication phase that forces the state to meet the
evidentiary burden required to justify family separation. Judge Gray’s

Mack, supra note 16, at 116.
See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1281, 1286 (1976).
36 Id.
37 Misty Johnson Grayer, Street-Level Judgments: How the Role of Judges
Influences the Decision to Collaborate in Juvenile Court 48 (Aug. 31, 2019) (Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Kansas), https://kuscholarworks.ku.edu/bitstream/handle/1808/
31364/Grayer_ku_0099D_16767_DATA_1.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y [https://perma.cc/
LDM9-AB7S].
38 E.g., Mack, supra note 16, at 117.
34
35
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approach delivers a blueprint for judges across the country to embrace their
role as sentinels during the preadjudication phase.
III. JUDGE GRAY’S IMPACT ON THE ORLEANS PARISH
FOSTER CARE SYSTEM
A. An Overview of Louisiana’s Statutory Preadjudication Scheme
This Piece uses the term preadjudication phase to refer to all legal
proceedings that occur between the initial court order authorizing removal
of a child from the custody of their parent(s), up until the adjudication when
a court holds a full evidentiary hearing to determine whether the
allegations in the petition are true. In Louisiana, there are two statutory
pathways to remove a child on an emergency basis.39 First, a police officer
or probation officer of the court may take a child into custody without a
court order when they “have reasonable grounds to believe that the child’s
surroundings are such as to endanger his welfare and immediate removal
appears to be necessary for his protection.”40 Second, the other pathway
begins when a police officer, district attorney, or Child Protective Services
(“CPS”) employee files a complaint with the court that contains facts
demonstrating there are “reasonable grounds to believe that the child is in
need of care and that emergency removal . . . is necessary to ensure the
child’s protection.”41 The court is required to determine whether the CPS
agency has made reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate the need for
removal.42 If the court determines that the child’s welfare cannot be
safeguarded without removal, the court will issue an instanter order
directing that child to be placed in the home of a relative or in foster care.43
Regardless of which pathway is utilized, the parents must be notified of the
time and place of the Continued Custody hearing.44 The Continued Custody
hearing must be held within three days of the child’s removal.45
During the Continued Custody hearing, the court is required to
undertake a number of inquiries.46 The State has the “burden of proving
the existence of a ground for continued custody.”47 The court evaluates
grounds for continued custody on a “necessity of care” standard: the State
must meet this standard by showing “reasonable grounds to believe that
the child is in need of care and that continued custody is necessary for his
safety and protection.”48 During this hearing, the child and their parent(s)
may “introduce evidence, call witnesses, be heard on their own behalf, and
39 Most, if not all, children are removed on an emergency basis. However, a nonemergency removal would involve a hearing with all parties where the Child Protective
Serices agency has the burden of producing sufficient evidence to remove the child from the
custody of their parent(s).
40 LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 621 (2006).
41 Id. art. 619 (2014).
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id. (removal pursuant to an Instanter Custody order); id. art. 621 (removal
without a court order).
45 Id. art. 624 (2018).
46 First, the court must ask each person before it whether they “know or have reason
to know that the child is an Indian child,” and thus subject to the protections in the federal
Indian Child Welfare Act. Id. art. 624(D).
47 Id. art. 624 (2018).
48 Id. art. 626 (2014).
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cross-examine witnesses called by the State.”49 Finally, the court is
required to advise the parents, and potentially the child, of a number of
rights and responsibilities related to the proceedings.50
Louisiana law prioritizes placement of the child into the home of a
relative over placement in foster care, pending the Continued Custody
hearing.51 Relatives who are willing to take custody of a child also seem to
have standing to intervene in a Continued Custody hearing to provide
“evidence of a willingness and ability to provide a wholesome and stable
environment for the child and to protect the health and safety of the
child.”52 This preference for relative placement or custody continues after
the Continued Custody hearing.53
The statutory preference for relatives is not reflected in the
placement data. Of the sixty-four children removed during 2017 who spent
less than a month in foster care in Orleans Parish,54 seventy percent were
placed in non-relative foster care during their brief stays.55 However,
Orleans Parish Juvenile Court does often award custody to relatives during
the preadjudication phase. Among the sixty-seven children removed during
2017 who spent less than a month in foster care, fifty-nine percent were
returned to their parent(s), while thirty-two percent were discharged to the
custody of a relative.56 This is double the statewide rate of discharges to
relatives during the same time frame, and well above national rates.57
This statutory scheme provides the framework in which Judge Gray
operated throughout her career. Although there are certainly differences
across jurisdictions, many of which are significant, Louisiana’s statutory
scheme generally reflects how children are removed across this nation.
Some professionals are afforded the power to remove children without a
court order, while others are required to seek court approval during an ex
parte proceeding.58 Once a child is removed, the court will typically hold a
hearing with all parties present within a few days of that removal to
determine whether removal was warranted and whether continued custody
is necessary.59 CPS is tasked with notifying relatives that a child has been
removed,60 and the court is often tasked with ensuring such notification
has taken place.

Id. art. 624 (2014).
Id. art. 625 (2015).
51 Id. art. 622(B) (2015); see also id. art. 622(A) (2015) (going so far as to allow a
relative “or other suitable individual” to seek an ex parte court order to take provisional
custody of the child pending the Continued Custody hearing).
52 Id. art. 624(H) (2015).
53 Id. art. 627(B)(2014).
54 A petition must be filed within thirty days of the Continued Custody hearing. Id.
art. 632(A) (2014). Thus, children that are discharged within thirty days of their removal
would be discharged during the preadjudication phase.
55 AFCARS Dataset, supra note 5, at FFY 2017.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 See Sankaran & Church, supra note 2, at 214.
59 Id.
60 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(29).
49
50
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Without any change to this statutory scheme, Judge Gray
transformed the Orleans Parish foster care system. The next Section
provides an overview of her approach.
B. The Disciplined Legal Process Judge Gray Instituted
Ernestine Gray was first elected to the Orleans Parish Juvenile
Court in 1984. Throughout her thirty-five year tenure with the court, Judge
Gray has enjoyed national recognition by way of numerous awards from,
and leadership positions with, prominent child welfare organizations.61 By
her own account, however, her first decade on the bench was not worthy of
recognition.62 Judge Gray is quick to reference a 1997 New York Times
article that levied an unwavering critique of the Orleans Parish Juvenile
Court, dubbing it the “worst juvenile court system in the country.”63
Although embarrassed by it at the time, Judge Gray now points to this
article as one of the early events that triggered her interest in redesigning
how the Orleans Parish Juvenile Court managed civil child abuse and
neglect proceedings.64 Her interest was initially focused on the
preadjudication phase of such proceedings.65
Judge Gray’s first step was to establish the Child Protection
Division of the court, which began operating in 2011.66 The judges within
that Division of the Orleans Parish Juvenile Court follow a monthly
rotation to handle child welfare agency requests for ex parte removals,
which as discussed in the previous Section, are granted through the
issuance of a written or oral instanter order.67 That same judge would then
preside over a Continued Custody hearing within three days of the child’s
removal. During the hearing, the State has the burden of proving
“reasonable grounds to believe the child was in need of care and that
continued custody was necessary for the child’s safety and protection.”68
Initially, for the sake of efficiency and expediency, Judge Gray
scheduled what she called a “Second Shelter” hearing to occur roughly
61 See, e.g., J. Richard Alan Ginkowski, ABA Criminal Justice Section Honors Judge
Ernestine S. Gray’s Lifetime of Service, AM. BAR ASSOC. (Jan. 8, 2021), https://www.american
bar.org/groups/judicial/publications/judicial_division_record_home/2021/vol24-2/cjs-honorse-gray/ [https://perma.cc/ZAR4-73C4] (Charles English Award); The Honorable Ernestine
Gray Honored With the ABA’s Charles R. English Award, NAT’L ASSOC. WOMEN JUDGES
(Jan. 6, 2021), https://www.nawj.org/blog/newsroom/news/the-honorable-ernestine-grayhonored-with-the-abas-charles-r-english-award [https://perma.cc/2QKC-GBWY] (further
noting Judge Gray’s prior awards such as Casey Excellence for Children Leadership Award).
62 Author Notes from Interview with Judge Ernestine Gray (Apr. 30, 2020) (on file
with corresponding author) [hereinafter Author’s Notes from Interview with Judge Gray].
63 Fox Butterfield, Few Options or Safeguards in a City’s Juvenile Courts, N.Y.
TIMES (July 22, 1997), https://www.nytimes.com/1997/07/22/us/few-options-or-safeguardsin-a-city-s-juvenile-courts.html [https://perma.cc/J3JY-82TC].
64 Author’s Notes from Interview with Judge Gray, supra note 62.
65 Although Judge Gray credits the New York Times article as a sort of turning
point to her approach in civil child abuse and neglect proceedings, it took over a decade for
her to have the seniority and autonomy to institute major changes.
66 Author’s Notes from Interview with Judge Gray, supra note 62.
67 LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. arts. 619–20. An oral instanter order can be issued only in
“exceptional circumstances,” and an affidavit confirming the facts presented orally must be
filed within twenty-four hours of the ex parte removal order.
68 Id. art. 624(A) (time frame for hearing); Id. art. 624(E) (burden of proof); Id. art.
626 (A) (grounds for continued custody).
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fourteen days after the Continued Custody hearing.69 Judge Gray presided
over all Second Shelter hearings, and every subsequent foster care
proceeding, for all children that remained in foster care beyond the
Continued Custody hearing in the Orleans Parish, regardless of the initial
judge assignment on the case.70 As the data discussed below show, very few
children remained in foster care after this Second Shelter hearing. Judge
Gray described the purpose of the hearing much like the purpose of a pretrial conference, with the primary goal of determining whether CPS was
prepared to file a timely petition. Its effect, however, is more aptly
described as part of the ongoing vigorous preadjudication gatekeeping
function inherent in Judge Gray’s approach, an approach that commonly
resulted in children being returned to their families within weeks of their
removal.71
As part of an ongoing Casey Family Programs study,72 a team
consisting mostly of lawyers—including this Piece’s co-authors—reviewed
and coded approximately thirty Orleans Parish Continued Custody and
Second Shelter hearings. What emerged from court observations and other
evidence was a clear judicial philosophy: Judge Gray approached every
hearing over which she presided with a laser focus on ensuring that
children were only placed in foster care when the State proved its burden
of the necessity of care. She articulated this in a formal interview with
Casey Family Programs:
When it comes down to it, I apply the law rigidly and do
what I believe the law requires, which means not removing
children from their families unless absolutely necessary.
Sometimes there is tension between what I consider to be
the appropriate thing in a case and what someone else
might consider appropriate: If the child protection agency
can’t offer evidence that a child’s safety is imminently at risk,
I send the child home to their family, consistently.73

Author’s Notes from Interview with Judge Gray, supra note 62.
Id.
71 A carefully calibrated foster care system would not remove children from their
parents for a few weeks, only to return them home, particularly in light of the welldocumented harm of removal. See Sankaran & Church, supra note 2, at 210–213; Trivedi,
supra note 2, at 527–51; Sankaran, Church, & Mitchell, supra note 2, at 1165–70. The
authors suspect that if Judge Gray had presided over every hearing from the very outset of
the case, including the ex parte request for removal, the number of children placed in foster
care would have been reduced significantly.
72 In 2020, Casey Family Programs funded a team of researchers to document Judge
Gray’s processes for presiding over civil child abuse and neglect proceedings in the Orleans
Parish, and to determine whether a causal relationship existed between those processes and
the significant reduction in the number of days children were separated from their family
due to foster care placement. The lead researchers were Vivek Sankaran, Melissa Carter,
and Andrew Barclay. Josh Gupta-Kagan and the Honorable (ret.) Karen Baynes also
provided research support. Christopher Church, Shemeka Sorrells, Ann Stanley, the
Honorable (ret.) Robin Sage, Alli Schisler, and Selena Childs served as Casey Family
Programs staff support. The study is ongoing as of the time of this publication.
73 How Can the Judiciary Help Narrow the Front Door to Child Protection? Q&A
with Judge Ernestine S. Gray, Orleans Parish, Louisiana, CASEY FAM. PROGRAMS (Dec. 4,
2020) [hereinafter Q&A with Judge Gray] (emphasis added), https://www.casey.org/judgegray-interview [https://perma.cc/LA37-VRHB].
69
70
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Central to her judicial philosophy is the belief that “[e]ach family
has the right to care for and protect their children without unreasonable
governmental interference.”74 Thus, during the preadjudication phase, she
considered it to be her paramount—and perhaps only—obligation to
enforce constitutional and statutory standards governing family
separation, and where separation was necessary, to ensure that children
were placed with kin as quickly and safely as possible.75 In her view,
“[f]amilies deserve not to be in court if they don’t have to be there.”76
Based on the initial set of hearings the team reviewed, some
consistent findings emerged. First, Judge Gray strictly enforced the State’s
statutory burdens. A number of exchanges between Judge Gray and the
parties stood out to the reviewers. During one hearing, for example, she
chastised the agency for producing stale evidence by relying solely on a
family’s prior history with CPS to justify family separation.77 She
remarked, “You’re not entitled to rely on those,” and told the agency that
they “can’t come here unless you’re certain” of the circumstances that exist
at the time of the current matter.78 In another hearing, she found that the
agency had not made reasonable efforts to prevent a child’s removal
because the agency had failed to “rule out” other options.79 Judge Gray
noted on the record: “You don’t go the measure of getting a hold order
unless you absolutely have to. And you have to rule out all of those other
things in order to get to that point.”80 In a third case in which a caseworker
failed to remember details about what a doctor had told him regarding a
child’s injuries, the attorney for the agency asked the court to give the
agency the benefit of the doubt.81 Judge Gray responded by forcefully
reminding everyone that the agency bore the burden of proof.82 Regardless
of what she might have believed was best for a child, she saw her primary
role as one of a foster care sentinel, standing guard over foster care’s front
door.
Second, Judge Gray faithfully enforced evidentiary rules. For
example, during the same Continued Custody hearing, the testifying case
manager was clearly struggling to remember certain details that the
department attorney wanted in the record.83 What immediately followed
seemed routine: the case manager opened a binder and began reviewing
Id.
This is, of course, consistent with the Louisiana Children’s Code, which directs
the Court to place the child in the “provisional custody of a suitable relative” as early as the
issuance of the instanter order if the Court determines the child’s welfare cannot be
safeguarded without removal. LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 619(B)(2).
76 Author’s Notes from Interview with Judge Gray, supra note 62.
77 Video Recording: 1004-CC, held by Orleans Parish Juvenile Court (May 30, 2019)
(on file with corresponding author). The Casey Family Programs researchers secured video
recordings of hundreds of hearings held in the Orleans Parish Juvenile Court between 2011
and 2020. The name of the recording is based on the assignment of a random number to each
hearing, followed by -CC for Continued Custody hearings and -SS for Second Shelter
hearings.
78 Id.
79 State ex rel. C.W., 2002-2419, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 05/14/03); 848 So.2d 70, 73.
80 Id.
81 Video Recording: 1000-CC, held by Orleans Parish Juvenile Court (Feb. 21, 2017)
(on file with corresponding author).
82 Id.
83 Id.
74
75

2022]

A QUIET REVOLUTION

his notes, presumably to refresh his memory.84 Judge Gray immediately
interrupted the case manager, both admonishing him and reminding
everyone that a witness is not allowed to reference notes or other materials
without the court’s express permission.85 In Judge Gray’s courtroom, the
rules of evidence were neither aspirational nor optional; they were strictly
enforced.
Third, Judge Gray openly shared the value she placed on ensuring
that children should only be removed from their parents when the State
meets its evidentiary burden justifying family separation. Even when the
agency was able to meet its burden, she routinely pushed the parties to
identify and place children with suitable relatives, consistent with
Louisiana’s preadjudication statutory scheme.86 For example, during one
Continued Custody hearing, Judge Gray asked a testifying case manager
whether she was able to identify any relatives.87 The case manager testified
that she was able to identify a number of relatives, at least one of whom
lived in the New Orleans area.88 The following exchange is illustrative:
Judge Gray: Did you notify the relatives that live in New
Orleans of this hearing?
Case manager: Yes, I sent them a letter.
Judge Gray: Wait, you just removed the child… When did
you send them a letter?
Case manager: When I got back to the office.
Judge Gray: And you thought they would get the letter in
time to come to this hearing?
Case manager: Department policy is to notify all–
[interrupted]
Judge Gray: I’m not asking you about department policy.
I’m asking you whether you thought by mailing a letter to
relatives here in New Orleans just a few days ago, you
thought they would show up to this hearing.
[pause]
No, you don’t mail them a letter. When they live in New
Orleans, you drive over and talk to them, tell them about
the hearing, check the home out, see if they can care for this
child.89
Judge Gray also incentivized the parties to negotiate agreements
outside of court to keep children with their families. On numerous
occasions, the parties finalized placements with kin—even kin living out of
state—during the time between the Continued Custody hearing and
Second Shelter hearing. For example, in one Continued Custody hearing,
Id.
Id.
86 See supra text accompanying notes 54–58.
87 Video Recording: 1000-CC (Feb. 21, 2017), supra note 81.
88 Id.
89 Id.
84
85
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Judge Gray ratified an arrangement on which the parties had reached
agreement outside of court, allowing for a child to live with a grandmother
in Texas.90 In most jurisdictions, this would have taken months, if not
years.91 In Judge Gray’s courtroom, it happened in days.
Finally, Judge Gray set high expectations by insisting that parties
show up to court prepared and by conducting thorough hearings. The first
Continued Custody hearing that the research team reviewed lasted more
than forty-five minutes, with Judge Gray asking numerous questions of the
witnesses,92 demanding that they present admissible evidence to satisfy
statutory burdens.93 During one exchange, she challenged the parent
attorney on her theory of the case with a curiosity and openness that
invited zealous legal advocacy.94 Judge Gray’s questioning also suggested
that she believed that the parent attorney might be trying to do an end-run
to overcome an objection of hers that Judge Gray had previously
overruled.95 After a few minutes of back-and-forth with the parent
attorney, Judge Gray smiled and said, “Oh, I see where you are going. . . .
Go ahead and proceed.”96 When attorneys showed up to court unprepared,
she paused her hearings and directed them to negotiate immediately in the
hallways of the courthouse. Her displeasure rarely went unnoticed; during
one hearing when the parties had agreed to place a child with a
grandmother but failed to work out important details related to parent
visitation, Judge Gray remarked:
This is why cases fall apart. I keep telling y’all you can’t plan
these cases fifteen minutes before you walk into my
courtroom. I keep saying that. I guess nobody believes me.97
In this way, she created an expectation that parties would actively
work together outside of court to pursue all options to prevent children
from living with strangers. Judge Gray did not exercise her judicial role in
the manner of a collaborative problem-solver, but rather, of the commander
of the problem-solving process.

90 Video Recording: 1000-SS, held by Orleans Parish Juvenile Court (Mar. 7, 2017)
(on file with corresponding author).
91 See AFCARS Dataset, supra note 5, at FFY 2020. The median length of stay
among all children discharged to a relative (excluding relative guardianships and relative
adoptions) during this timeframe was 5.7 months nationally, compared to 0.2 months in the
Orleans Parish. Nine jurisdictions (RI, MI, CT, MD, IN, GA, MO, IA, NC) had a median
length of stay for children discharged to a relative (excluding relative guardianships and
relative adoptions) that exceeded a year.
92 Video Recording: 1000-CC (Feb. 21, 2017), supra note 81. The researchers
developed a tool to code the hearings, capturing the number of questions the judge and
attorneys ask during each hearing. The analyses are on file with the corresponding author.
93 Id.
94 Video Recording: 1000-SS (Mar. 7, 2017), supra note 90.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Video Recording: 1002-CC, held by Orleans Parish Juvenile Court (May 28, 2019)
(on file with corresponding author).
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C. The Outcomes that Followed Judge Gray’s Reorganization of the
Orleans Parish Juvenile Court Process for Civil Child Abuse and
Neglect Proceedings
Reorganized at Judge Gray’s direction, the Orleans Parish Juvenile
Court dramatically reduced the number of children in foster care.
Importantly, there is no evidence that this transformed approach
jeopardized the safety of children.98 As stated in the Introduction, there
were over two hundred children in care in 2011 when Judge Gray
undertook her efforts to reorganize the court process.99 By March of 2017,
just twenty children were in foster care.100 At that time, Orleans Parish
had the lowest rate of children in care in the state,101 with 2.5 children in
foster care for every 10,000 in the population (“per 10K”), compared to a
statewide rate of 40.6 per 10K.102 During this same period, the national
rate of children in foster care was 58.5 per 10K.103 If the Orleans Parish
children in care rate of 2.5 per 10K children were applied across the country
as of March 31, 2020, there would be just over 18,000 children in foster care
rather than the 415,170 that were actually in care on that date.104
Children in New Orleans also moved through the system—from
removal of custody and placement in foster care, to exit and case closure—
at a much faster rate. Of the children who entered foster care in Orleans
Parish during the first six months of 2017, 64% were discharged from foster
care within thirty days of their removal, compared to 18% of children
statewide.105 The dynamics of that reduction, however, are complex.
Removals to and discharges from foster care in the Orleans Parish were
relatively stable during this time frame, closely mirroring each other.106
This is likely because Judge Gray’s court processes had a significant impact
on children only after the Continued Custody hearing. Under her scheme,
the five or so (depending on the time frame) juvenile court judges in the
Orleans Parish handled ex parte requests for removal on a rotating
monthly basis. When a particular judge granted an ex parte removal
request, that same judge presided over the Continued Custody hearing. It
was only after that hearing that Judge Gray assumed presiding duties over
all the civil child abuse and neglect cases, with her Second Shelter hearing
automatically scheduled for all children in care after the Continued
Custody hearing.107 As discussed above, 64% of children in foster care were
discharged from foster care within thirty days of their removal.108 Of those

See supra Section III.C.
AFCARS Dataset, supra note 5, at FFY 2011.
100 Id. at FFY 2017.
101 This is excluding Cameron Parish, the second smallest parish (population-wise)
in Louisiana, which only has an estimated 1,500 children living in the Parish and had none
in foster care at that time.
102 AFCARS Dataset, supra note 5, at FFY 2017.
103 Id.
104 Id. at FFY 2020. Applying the Orleans Parish 2.5 per 10K rate to the estimated
national child population of 72,847,400 children living in the United States suggests a total
foster care population of 18,211.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Id. at FFY 2017.
98
99
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children, 84% exited within two weeks of their removal, highlighting Judge
Gray’s impact during the preadjudication phase.109
It can be seen that an explanatory metric of Judge Gray’s impact
on the Orleans Parish dynamics would consist of not only how often, but
also how long, children are separated from their family. Fostering Court
Improvement’s Family Separation Metric, which is a simple count of the
aggregate days all children spend separated from their family due to foster
care placement, measures precisely that.110 The number accounts for
entries, exits, and length-of-stay. Figure 1 highlights the 90% reduction in
the aggregate number of days all children were separated from their family
for purposes of foster care placement between 2011 and 2017 in Orleans
Parish.111 The scale of this reduction is unprecedented.

Orleans Parish: Family Separation Metric
2009 to 2020a FFY, Courtesy of Fostering Court
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Figure 1: Orleans Parish Family Separation Metric

Id. at FFY 2009–2020.
The Family Separation Metric represents a sum of all days that children spend
separated from their family for purposes of foster care placement during a particular time
frame, most commonly a year. Days separated from family include all days that children are
in foster care except days spent in relative placements, pre-trial home visits, and preadoptive home placements. The non-profit organization and data collaboration effort
Fostering Court Improvement reports this both as a single number and as a rate (per 10K
children). For state-by-state data and county-by-county data, see State Websites, FOSTERING
CT. IMPROVEMENT, https://www.fosteringcourtimprovement.org/state_websites.php [https://
perma.cc/6VF2-8RUR]. See also, e.g., Project from The Imprint, Data on Family Separation,
WHO CARES: A NATIONAL COUNT OF FOSTER HOMES AND FAMILIES, https://www.foster
carecapacity.com/data/family-separation [https://perma.cc/9UPA-YWCZ] (annual state-bystate data from 2011 through 2020 on average days that a child spends separated from family
per year); Melissa Carter & Andrew Barclay, We Want Kids to Grow Up in Safe Families. So
Let’s Measure That., IMPRINT (Nov. 6, 2018), https://imprintnews.org/opinion/op-ed-we-wantkids-to-grow-up-in-safe-families-so-lets-measure-that/32667 [https://perma.cc/D2CA-5Y7H]
(summarizing some state-by-state conclusions from a “person-time metric” measuring the
“time kids spend with non-family”).
111 The analysis uses AFCARS Datasets, supra note 5, at FFY 2009–2020.
109
110
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Moreover, a wealth of administrative data suggests that the
reduction in family separation occurred without compromising safety for
children. While family separation significantly decreased in the Orleans
Parish between 2011 and 2017, the number of children and families subject
to CPS investigations did not.112 On March 31, 2011, Orleans Parish
investigated children at a rate of 14.6 per 10K, compared to 23.4 per 10K
statewide.113 On March 31, 2017, Orleans Parish investigated children at
a rate of 28.3 per 10K, compared to 26.1 per 10K statewide.114 During the
period in which the Orleans Parish Juvenile Court was significantly
decreasing its foster care footprint, the Orleans Parish CPS agency was
increasing its child protection footprint.
Thus, it is reasonable to assume that if children were more at risk
as a result of the unprecedented reduction in family separation by the
Orleans Parish Juvenile Court, the CPS agency would have captured this
via subsequent investigated reports of alleged maltreatment, since
investigations were not curbed alongside the reduction in family
separation. Subsequent reports of substantiated maltreatment are
commonly referred to as a recurrence of maltreatment, and are typically
measured at six- or twelve-month intervals.115 In other words, a recurrence
of maltreatment has occurred when a child is the subject of two separate
substantiated reports of maltreatment during a six-month period. Since
the median length of stay for a child in the Orleans Parish foster care
system was so brief during this period of unprecedented reduction,
recurrence of maltreatment metrics should capture whether child safety
was being compromised by Judge Gray’s approach. However, recurrence of
maltreatment in the Orleans Parish hovered around six percent during the
reduction in family separation, dropping closer to five percent in 2017.116
Despite the near elimination of foster care, Orleans Parish rates of
recurrence of maltreatment remained comparable to statewide rates.117
Another useful, yet imperfect, assessment of the safety of the
reduction in family separation in the Orleans Parish is the child fatality
rate in the jurisdiction. Child fatality rates in the Orleans Parish were
comparable to statewide rates between 2011 and 2017, and Orleans Parish
rates declined in all but one year during this time frame. Even more
notably, Orleans Parish rates were below child fatality rates in two other

112 Child. Bureau, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., National Child Abuse and
Neglect Data System (“NCANDS”) Child File, Federal Fiscal Years 2010–2019, NAT’L DATA
ARCHIVE ON CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT [hereinafter NCANDS Child File Dataset], https://
www.ndacan.acf.hhs.gov/datasets/datasets-list-ncands-child-file.cfm [https://perma.cc/4LTF
-B84V] (data on file with corresponding author).
113 Id. at FFY 2017.
114 Id.
115 See, e.g., CHILD. BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., CFSR ROUND
3 STATEWIDE DATA INDICATOR SERIES 1 (2019) (defining, for the purposes of the Children’s
Bureau’s Child and Family Services Review (“CFSR”), the indicator for “recurrence of
maltreatment” by reference to “another substantiated or indicated maltreatment report”).
116 Id.
117 Id. Using a lagging twelve-month average, recurrence of maltreatment statewide
consistently hovered between five percent and six percent during the referenced period.
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large Louisiana jurisdictions that consistently have higher rates of family
separation than those of Orleans Parish.118
In sum, Judge Gray’s approach did not influence the actions of
mandatory reporters, who continued to refer an increasing number of
allegations that the CPS agency screened in and investigated. Judge Gray’s
approach also did not significantly influence the frequency with which
children were removed on an emergency basis.119 Rather, Judge Gray’s
influence seemed to impact only the length of time a child was under court
supervision, and more critically, separated from their family. So, contrary
to what critics of Judge Gray feared, although significantly fewer children
were separated from their families, the CPS agency was not flooded with
calls of children “being endangered by returning . . . to families in chaos.”120
Less social control shook the confidence of some child welfare system
stakeholders, but it did not jeopardize child safety. Rather, it improved the
system’s ability to protect the integrity of families.
IV. LESSONS FOR THE FIELD
As suggested at the outset, what is remarkable about Judge Gray’s
approach is how unremarkable it was. During the preadjudication stage,
she strictly enforced the constitutional presumptions and legal standards
that govern foster care proceedings. She held parties to evidentiary rules
to ensure she only considered proper evidence. Through her questioning of
witnesses and lawyers, she satisfied herself that all of the relevant
evidence was presented at the hearings. She maintained high standards
for counsel, expecting them to work extensively to resolve matters outside
of the courtroom and to be disciplined legal advocates inside the courtroom.
These are the core functions of a judge: enforce the law; abide by
evidentiary rules; encourage out of court settlements.
However, as detailed in Part I, the import of these essential core
functions to a particular juvenile court judge is not always apparent. Calls
to collaborate and problem-solve induce judges to defer to the judgment of
others and relax procedure at critical decision-making points. Yet a
disciplined fidelity to those core gatekeeping functions seems to directly
serve the outcomes at the intersection of child protection and family
preservation. Defining judicial leadership in a way that aligns with the
value of the traditional judicial role seems to have significantly reduced
reliance on family separation without compromising child safety. Judge
Gray’s work in New Orleans demonstrates the powerful impact juvenile
court judges can have when they embrace their gatekeeper role. That is,
judges must consider it their paramount obligation to enforce the State’s

118 Nat’l Ctr. for Health Stats., Underlying Cause of Death 1999–2020, CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION: WONDER DATABASE, https://wonder.cdc.gov [https://
perma.cc/9N5T-SWM3] (analysis of data for children on file with Fostering Court
Improvement).
119 As discussed above, removal rates did decrease in the Orleans Parish, but only
slightly.
120 Richard A. Webster, One Judge’s Tough Approach to Foster Care: It’s Only for
the Really Extreme Cases, WASH. POST (Nov. 25, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
national/one-judges-tough-approach-to-foster-care-its-only-for-the-really-extreme-cases/20
19/11/24/bd2dd322-0a4c-11ea-97ac-a7ccc8dd1ebc_story.html [https://perma.cc/J3JY-82TC].
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statutory and constitutional burdens to prove that a child has been harmed
or is at imminent risk of harm before placing that child in foster care.
Implementing this approach might require changes in how courts
structure removal hearings, along with changes in how an individual judge
handles removal hearings. Judges presiding over removal hearings—both
ex parte and contested hearings—must be trained in constitutional and
statutory removal standards and the corollary for the judicial role. Judges
must exercise their power and authority in the preadjudication phase not
to achieve a particular end result but to ensure that family separation is
used only when foster care is the least restrictive intervention. This value
must be shared amongst all those handling removal hearings and must be
espoused publicly—as it was by Judge Gray—to influence the broader
culture of the court in ways that support meaningful and lasting change.
Considerations of how to persuade judges to embrace these values,
especially in the preadjudication stage, must be a focal point for future
conversations in the child welfare community.
Courts must not only ensure that every judge is properly trained
and shares these core values, but also create a structure to ensure that
initial removal decisions are reviewed in an expedited manner. Key to the
success in New Orleans was Judge Gray’s two-week review of initial
removal decisions. At these hearings, she assessed whether the initial
removal decision was warranted, whether continued removal was
warranted, and whether any of the risks that might have existed had since
abated. She also used these hearings to ensure that children were placed
with kin whenever possible. Immediately after the Continued Custody
hearing, the looming Second Shelter hearing served as an ominous
reminder to all parties that they would soon have to answer to Judge Gray
as to why the child was still in care, why the child was not placed with kin,
and what efforts were underway to file a timely petition. Systemic players
knew that excuses for not having answers to any of these questions would
be met with judicial hostility. Ideally, jurists should evaluate these factors
before ever separating a family. But they must also build in processes to
revisit the initial removal decision frequently and expeditiously.
During the preadjudication phase, judges must rigorously enforce
substantive legal standards and evidentiary rules. They must use statutes
and court rules as their checklists. They must be willing to hold parties to
their burdens, regardless of judicial hunch or personal feelings about the
outcome. They must encourage a culture of advocacy, inviting lawyers
before them to actively litigate all relevant matters. At a minimum, the
advocate’s task involves calling witnesses, questioning them extensively,
and making thorough arguments before the judge. When attorneys fail to
develop the record, judges must be prepared to ask questions from the
bench, as Judge Gray regularly did. By taking these steps, judges can
convey to families and stakeholders the seriousness of the decision to
separate families.
Finally, judges must create an expectation that parties work
together outside the courtroom, collaborating to eliminate the need for
foster care. This collaboration might include conversations about
conditions that would allow children to safely remain with their parents. It
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might entail taking steps to overcome barriers for a kinship placement.
Regardless of the specific topic of the out-of-court conversation, it requires
a shift in the mindset of the parties towards an ethos of continuous effort
to get children out of foster care, requiring work and advocacy inside and
outside of court. Judicial leadership is not about co-creating solutions but
rather about setting an expectation and overseeing a process for problems
to be solved.
These are the essential steps that Judge Gray took in New Orleans
that are immediately replicable nationwide without any statutory
modifications or influx of resources. However, one outstanding question
remains, related to the role that judicial collaboration plays in this
approach, especially given its prevalence as an enduring and prominent
theme in juvenile court practice and policy. How does collaboration fit into
the approach outlined above, which prioritizes the judge’s role as a neutral
arbiter of the dispute and enforcer of the law, one who is dispassionate
about outcomes?
While a judge must perform their role as gatekeeper until a parent
has been proven to be unfit, there are opportunities for meaningful
collaboration at other stages of a case. For example, judges can, and should,
work with community providers and the child welfare agency to ensure
that appropriate services are available for families. Judges should convene
collaborative meetings with stakeholders to identify systemic barriers that
might be interfering with how cases are handled. Judges can inspire
community members to serve as foster parents or respite caregivers. In
fact, Judge Gray played many of these collaborative roles in her
community. But none of these collaborative roles can come at the expense
of judges’ roles as foster care sentinels. This is the lesson of Judge Gray’s
approach in the Orleans Parish: strict adherence to the traditional judicial
role at the preadjudication stage of a dependency case can drive an
unprecedented reduction in family separation and the near-elimination of
foster care.
V. CONCLUSION
In hindsight, Jude Gray’s impact on the Orleans Parish Juvenile
Court is nothing short of revolutionary. Yet the revolution was quiet. That
is not to suggest that Judge Gray’s leadership was without criticism,
although that is a topic by which this Piece has refused to be distracted.
However, a local CASA director’s comments capture how polarizing Judge
Gray can be in the Orleans Parish: “There are people who absolutely see
her as a model for change, somebody who should be held up as an example
and followed . . . and you will definitely find people who intensely dislike
her and feel very strongly that what she has done is wrong.”121 Yet for the
unprecedented change she brought about in the Orleans Parish, there

121 Webster, supra note 120 (quoting the executive director of CASA New Orleans).
A CASA is a “court appointed special advocate,” a citizen volunteer appointed by judges to
advocate for the children’s best interests. CASA volunteers are trained and managed by
programmatic offices in local jurisdictions. Our Work, NAT’L CASA/GAL ASS’N FOR CHILD.,
https://nationalcasagal.org/our-work/ [https://perma.cc/4HUL-FNAH].
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seemed to be little awareness, and virtually no evidence, of efforts to
document or disseminate her approach.
Judge Gray’s approach in New Orleans is a blueprint for the court’s
role in safely reducing the number of children in foster care, a fully
attainable goal in our current system. The phenomenon of the Orleans
Parish’s near elimination of foster care is explained in large part by
interrogating the role of the juvenile court judge. By amplifying Judge
Gray’s values and disciplined approach to the law during the
preadjudication phase, we hope other judges will follow suit.
Judge Gray retired at the end of 2020. While she remains a frequent
contributor to national conversations about foster care, few focus on how
she safely reduced the number of days that children are separated from
their families by ninety percent. The process Judge Gray created in the
Orleans Parish Juvenile Court remains in place; all juvenile court judges
will continue to handle ex parte removals on a rotating monthly basis, and
the juvenile court judge now assigned to Judge Gray’s former section will
continue to preside over all civil child abuse and neglect proceedings
following the Continued Custody hearing. Left in Judge Gray’s wake is the
deepest of curiosities we hope to answer upon the conclusion of our study:
Is it the process, or the processor, that matters? We trust, and perhaps fear,
it is the latter.

